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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
Arnold Established That He Received Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel By A Preponderance Of Evidence
As a result of inadequate preparation and investigation, trial counsel failed to
present Jennifer and other witnesses to establish that Arnold was the vehicle’s
mechanic, establish that Berdine frequently drove the vehicle, and to refute the
officer’s testimony that Berdine was supervised at all times.1 The evidence trial
counsel failed to present would have directly refuted the state’s theory of the case
and, therefore, Arnold established a reasonable probability that but for trial
counsel’s ineffective assistance, the result of the trial would have been different.
A.

Trial counsel’s decision not to call Jennifer was unreasonable
and prejudicial
According to the state, the argument that trial counsel performed deficiently

“fails as a threshold matter” because it does not address the district court’s factual
findings that Jennifer was not called based on Mr. Anderson’s discussion with trial
counsel and his desire not to accuse his daughter of possession the
methamphetamine. Respondent’s Brief, p. 10. The state is in error. Mr. Anderson
does not claim that the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous but

Counsel has determined that those arguments presented in the Appellant’s Brief,
which are not addressed herein, sufficiently address the state’s arguments and that
further reply is not required.
1

1

that the district court’s application of those findings to the law and the other
undisputed evidence establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Trial counsel arrived at his conclusion to not utilize Jennifer as a witness
after a single conversation with his client in which they discussed blaming Jennifer
for the methamphetamine and Arnold indicated he did not want to “point the
finger” at his daughter. Had counsel conducted any further investigation, such as
interviewing Jennifer as she requested, he would have discovered Jennifer had
relevant knowledge that would inculpate Berdine. For instance, Jennifer’s
testimony would have established that Berdine had driven the car frequently in the
preceding month. Her testimony also would have contradicted the officer’s
testimony that Berdine was under constant surveillance in the vehicle and establish
the car windows were tinted. The district court did not discredit Jennifer’s
testimony, instead finding it was reasonable to not consider Jennifer as a witness
because Arnold did not want to point the finger at his daughter.
The state argues the district court correctly “found this was a strategic
decision, made only after weighing the potential value of Jennifer’s testimony
against Anderson’s specific ‘desire not to point the finger at his daughter.’”
Respondent’s Brief, p. 8 (internal citations omitted). However, it is undisputed that
trial counsel and Arnold did not discuss that Jennifer could testify that Berdine had
prior access to the vehicle and that she could testify about the car’s features such as
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tinted windows. Because trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation to
inform himself as to the full benefit of Jennifer’s testimony, his “weighing of the
potential benefit” of Jennifer’s testimony was flawed and objectively unreasonable.
Accordingly, the district court’s finding that trial counsel’s decision not to interview
Jennifer was strategic is clearly erroneous.
The state notes Arnold has not cited a case for the proposition that it is
ineffective assistance of counsel to go against the wishes of his client and call a
relative to the stand. Respondent’s Brief, p. 11. Effective counsel involves basic
duties that neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Instead, inquiry into counsel’s performance must be must
be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.
Id. The post-conviction applicant is not required to find a case mirroring the
particular facts to support an argument with “authority.”
Additionally, the state’s over-simplification ignores that Arnold’s desire to not
blame his daughter did not obviate counsel’s duty to conduct a full investigation.
Nor would discussing the findings of that investigation and discussing alternate
reasons to call Jennifer as a witness conflict with Arnold’s desire to not blame his
daughter.
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Trial counsel’s explanation for not calling Jennifer as a witness establishes
that he failed to interview her or otherwise make himself aware of the relevance of
her testimony. Had trial counsel interviewed Jennifer, he would have recognized
that the relevance of her testimony went far beyond “pointing the finger” and that
she had relevant knowledge to refute the state’s theory of the case. Moreover, the
absence of Jennifer as a witness undermines confidence in the trial’s outcome and
establishes a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted Arnold absence
counsel’s deficient performance. The district court erred in dismissing the petition.
B.

Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Utilize Jennifer’s
Testimony To Establish Berdine Was Unsupervised And To Impeach
The Officers
Jennifer and Arnold’s son testified at the evidentiary hearing that Berdine

remained in the car without an officer standing at the passenger window when they
arrived on the scene. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 29, ln. 1-24; p. 41, ln. 13 - p. 42, ln. 21. At
the evidentiary hearing, Officer Applewhite initially testified that Arnold was
outside the car when he arrived on scene and then changed his mind after being
reminded of his trial testimony. Id. at p. 116, ln. 20 - p. 117, ln. 18.
In dismissing Arnold’s petition, the district court found Officer Applewhite’s
jury trial testimony the most credible and that Berdine was constantly surveyed
while sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle. R. 657-58. As noted in Arnold’s
opening brief, the question for the district court was whether counsel should have
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utilized Jennifer and her brother as witnesses and, if they had been called, whether
the jury would have found reasonable doubt. Appellant’s Brief, p. 18. Whether the
district court personally credited Officer Applewhite’s trial testimony — which it
reviewed from a cold transcript — over Officer Applewhite and the siblings’
testimony at the evidentiary hearing, is entirely distinct from whether the
testimony would have effected the jury’s verdict.
In response, the state notes the challenge to the district court’s credibility
finding is being made for the first time on appeal. Respondent’s Brief, p. 17.
However, the purpose of this appeal is to challenge the district court’s findings in
dismissing Mr. Anderson’s post-conviction relief application.
The state also claims that Mr. Anderson’s argument that his attorney should
have challenged the officers’ testimony with available witnesses was raised for the
first time on appeal. Respondent’s Brief, p. 18. The state is incorrect.
In closing argument, Arnold noted the officers’ trial testimony differed from
their testimony at the evidentiary hearing regarding the timing of Officer
Applewhite’s arrival and whether Berdine was unsupervised for any time in the
vehicle. R. 620-21. Arnold also argued that Jennifer's testimony that the arrest
occurred at night, and the vehicle had dark tinted windows “was extremely
important” because it challenged the officer’s credibility and showed that Berdine
was left alone in the vehicle. R. 621. The failure to present evidence regarding the
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tinted windows, vehicle’s lighting and Berdine’s unsupervised status first appeared
in the initial petition, testimony was received at the evidentiary hearing and
argument was presented to the district court. The issue was presented in the
district court.
The state also notes trial counsel’s unsuccessful attempt to impeach the
officer and contends that “it was a reasonable strategic choice not to belabor a point
that the officer had already convincingly explained.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 20.
Perhaps such a choice could be characterized as strategic if there was evidence that
trial counsel knew that Jennifer could have provided such testimony. Moreover, the
officer’s “convincing” explanation related to the inability to hear the other officer’s
command on the audio recording. Jennifer would have testified that she observed
Berdine unsupervised in the car that he had periodically possessed in the past
month. The officer’s convincing explanation about the wind effecting the audio
recording does not discredit Jennifer’s observation.
Because of trial counsel’s inadequate preparation, the jury heard no evidence
that: Berdine was unsupervised in the vehicle, Jennifer primarily owned the car,
Arnold only possessed it while doing repairs, that Berdine frequently used the
vehicle, and that Berdine used the vehicle earlier in the evening before turning it
over to Arnold. Had the jury heard this evidence, there is a reasonable probability
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the outcome of the trial would have been different. The district court erred in
denying Arnold’s petition for post-conviction relief.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above and in Mr. Anderson’s opening brief, he
established that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and this Court should
reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing Arnold’s petition and remand with
instruction to grant his requested relief. Arnold further asks the Court to reverse
the district court’s denial of the metadata and remand with instruction to grant that
motion.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April 2018.
FYFFE LAW

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for Arnold Dean Anderson
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